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1. Introduction
This article analyses the increased use of instruments of quantitative analysis 
in law, such as indicators, rankings and benchmarking. Paragraph two starts 
by setting this development within the broader framework of globalization and 
its challenge to the authority of States, which changes the traditional mecha-
nisms of law-making and implementation. This phenomenon modifies the char-
acteristics of rules, blurring the boundaries between law and other means of 
social control, the actors involved and the mechanisms of implementation and 
accountability. As a consequence, new forms of law are created which come 
under the general notion of transnational law, and new kinds of relations, both 
co-operative and conflicting, are established between law and other forms of 
social control, which are related to governance. The third paragraph focuses 
on the shift that globalization and governance entail in the mechanisms of rules 
production, particularly through the increased use of instruments of measure-
ment and quantification, such as indicators and rankings, which increasingly 
displace law and traditional legal and political processes. These mechanisms 
can ease decision-making and accountability in contexts where political legit-
imacy is weak or disputed, as in transnational contexts. Yet, the aura of sim-
plicity, neutrality and scientific nature that they display hides important political 
stakes and has important consequences, both legal and political. Paragraph 
four analyses the challenges of these new instruments for the epistemological 
bases of law, particularly comparative law. It focuses on the different methods 
of analysis, as well as the different concepts and categories, of law and other 
social sciences, and the consequences that these elements have in the use of 
quantitative analysis and measurement. It claims that the use of quantification 
implies a radical shift from the traditional methods, aims and concepts of law, 
and requires a comprehensive discussion of them in relation to other sciences. 
In the fifth paragraph the article shifts its focus onto the recent developments 
of European private law, starting from the harmonization efforts related to the 
internal market, and their relation to the wider constitutional debate in the EU. 
After a long period where harmonization was fragmentary and selective, in the 
1990s a new phase of comprehensive harmonization efforts of private law has 
started, related to the boost of the internal market programme. These efforts 
were based on traditional national models, in particular Civil codes, and finally 
failed because of the impossibility of solving in this way the fundamental con-
flict between the selective scope of the internal market-related harmonization at 
the EU level, and the comprehensive nature of private law at the national level, 
which embodies the fundamental legal values and principles of horizontal legal 
relations. Differently, private law is rapidly developing at the EU level in a variety 
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of selected areas, with completely different characteristics, a topic which is the 
object of paragraph six. New instances of what has been termed European “reg-
ulatory private law” (Micklitz) are expanding through new modes of governance, 
of which quantification and measurement are important elements. These fields 
display different actors, rule-making procedures, mechanisms of implementa-
tion and control, which show important similarities with the features analysed 
in the first part of the work. The article concludes highlighting some important 
elements, both practical and theoretical, on which future research in this area 
should focus, having important implications for the legal analysis of globalization 
and the rise of transnational law, particularly in the area of European integration.
2. Globalization and the rise of transnational law
Globalization is a complex and multifarious phenomenon1. While in the 
1990’s there was a long period of enthusiasm for the advances and benefits that 
globalization could produce, nowadays it increasingly receives critical scrutiny, 
underlining its dangers and drawbacks, and its drive towards growing tensions 
and inequalities in all fields (economic, legal, social, cultural), that need to be 
addressed. Yet, in spite of all criticism, globalization is far from fading away, and 
its impact remains unabated.
The general trend of globalisation has increasingly blurred the geographical 
and physical boundaries of States, with a compression of time and space that 
enlarges the scope of interactions and increases their speed2. This phenomenon 
calls into question the traditional Western core notion of State sovereignty as a 
model of isolated, independent and exclusive national orders, a “black box mod-
el” where the identification of an exclusive territory is crucial in order to define the 
jurisdiction of the State, i.e., its role in the production and enforcement of rules, 
which now increasingly take place outside national borders3. 
In the legal sphere, this is the core tenet of legal positivism, where law is 
firmly structured around the fundamental basis of the State4, and is hierarchically 
1 Globalization is not a completely new phenomenon: there have been several waves of globalization 
(starting with the great empires of antiquity), but the current globalization phase has very specific character-
istics. See Weinstein (2005); RitzeR (2007). 
2 See Cassese (2005), p. 973.
3 tWining (2000); MiChaels (2005) 1209; FeRRaRese (2000).
4 A fundamental change took place in the international context in the 20th century: the number of States 
approximately tripled after the collapse of Western empires, the movement towards the self-determination 
of peoples gained momentum, and regional and international organisations established for the purposes 
of cooperation in a wide range of fields (political, economic, cultural, etc.) proliferated, thereby creating a 
dense network of relations which clearly cannot be accomodated in a binary model. See glenn (2014). On 
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organised inside the State, and horizontally among States at the international 
level.5 Globalization and its related legal dynamic have radically altered this legal 
landscape, and have highlighted the need to rethink legal concepts and catego-
ries, although revision and innovation can be made difficult by the existing cat-
egories and intellectual patterns, which are deeply entrenched and profoundly 
affect the attitudes and practice of lawyers. In particular, a binary conception of 
law has characterized Western law since Roman law established the summa 
divisio between ius civile and ius gentium. Later, Western legal thinking rejected 
the possibility of recognising the existence and validity of law that is situated 
in a middle ground between national and international law, since this contra-
dicts the fundamental principles on which law has been based since the birth 
of the Westphalian State in the sixteenth century, with its absolute conception 
of sovereignty and territoriality6. Nevertheless, the development of law over and 
across national boundaries worldwide, linked to globalization, has fostered a 
new kind of “transnational law” (a term originally coined in the 1950s)7, in which 
the boundaries between international, supranational and transnational law are 
increasingly blurred8. In spite of its fuzzy nature, transnational law is a useful cat-
egory, because it applies a different perspective to the analysis of legal phenom-
ena that cannot be comprehensively grasped by applying national/international 
legal categories9. It is characterized by legal pluralism10, not only of the sources 
of legal rules, but also of enforcement mechanisms, which fosters the growth of 
the significant impact that the binary relationship between law and state has had on law as an academic 
subject, and its crisis due to the pressure of globalization, see DeDek (2015).
5 E.g., in the idea of Grundnorm in kelsen (1989) and haRt (1961).
6 glenn (2014), p. 61, underlines that this binary legal world is related to binary logic as a defining feature 
the entire Western philosophical and scientific Weltanschauung, starting from the philosophies of Plato and 
Aristotle. 
7 The term transnational law was first employed by Jessup, professor of international law at Columbia 
University, in relation to complex legal situations in which governments, international organisations and pri-
vate parties are involved, requiring analytical tools that combine instruments used in various areas of the law 
(public international law, conflict of laws, private law, procedural law, etc). He did not refer to transnational 
law as an independent branch of law, but rather as a flexible approach to issues that could not be easily 
dealt with through the dichotomies of private/public law and international/national law, focusing on concrete 
cases, rather than on new taxonomies and classifications. See P.C. Jessup (1956). 
8 tuoRi (2014) considers transnational law “the true El Dorado of legal hybrids” (p. 17), which cuts 
across all disciplinary boundaries and blurs them, making it increasingly difficult to achieve a general, sys-
tematic and coherent organisation of the different branches of law.
9 See glenn (2003), p. 839; special issue of the Revue Internationale de Droit Economique on “Les 
grandes théories du droit transnational”, 2013/1; MiCklitz, (2014a), p. 273: “Transnational law is a play-
ground for curious researchers interested in combining legal practice with all sorts of legal and non-legal 
theories”. 
10 See P.S. BeRMan (2014); Id., (2007) 1155; gRiFFiths (1986) 1; gRaziaDei (2015), 485.
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“legal hybrids”11, composite legal materials produced by a dynamic process of 
interaction. 
Transnational legal spaces, where different legal orders and systems com-
pete for authority, are increasingly dense and complex12. In such a framework, 
the need to find new mechanisms for solving conflicts among different systems 
and actors becomes crucial.13 In some cases the outcome of this confrontation 
is a pure “power” solution, where different systems compete and the most pow-
erful (economically, socially, or politically) becomes hegemonic. But there is also 
evidence of increasing interconnectedness and cooperation among systems14, 
which implies a certain degree of acceptance of diversity within a legal space, 
where rules and institutions regulate the co-existence of the different systems. 
This situation, defined by de Sousa Santos as “interlegality”, is characterised by 
overlap, interpenetration and dialogue.15 It requires a substantial effort in order 
to devise new solutions beyond a merely confrontational and conflicting logic, 
and a search for compatibility and adjustment, moving away from a purely State- 
-centric idea of law, through new concepts and categories, both substantial and 
procedural16.
In this setting, the features of regulation change as well: since State law is 
no longer able to fully control and discipline these transnational phenomena, the 
gap is filled by a variety of actors producing a variety of norms17. Law is increas-
ingly produced outside the State, either by international organisations or by pri-
vate entities, and rules that have legal effects are created outside traditional legal 
mechanisms, through a process of multiple hybridisation that makes it difficult 
11 See tuoRi (2014) p. 11, who writes about “legal phenomena that our inherited conceptual framework 
is unable to capture and imprison in a determinate conceptual box” (p. 14). See also tuoRi, On Legal 
Hybrids, in Micklitz, svetiev (2012). 
12 This phenomenon is analysed also in the framework of “polycentricity”: see, e.g., peteRsen, zahle 
(1995). 
13 In the area of EU law, a new model has been proposed by Christian Joerges: his conflicts-law theory 
aims at co-ordinating EU and national laws by constructing EU law as a tool compensating for the failings of 
national laws (which are due to the gradual erosion of national competences linked to the Europeanisation 
and globalisation process): see JoeRges (2012) 644; JoeRges (2010). 
14 Many works focus on the similarities between the new trans-systemic laws and those existing before 
the consolidation of the Westphalian State in Europe, at the time of the ius commune, when a number of 
overlapping and sometimes clashing legal systems co-existed in the same geographical area and generat-
ed a body of rules connecting them. See H. BeRMan (1983); glenn (2007); ziMMeRMann (2001).
15 de sousa santos (2002): “we live in a time of porous legality or of legal porosity, multiple networks of 
legal orders forcing us to constant transitions and trespassing. Our legal life is constituted by an intersection 
of different legal orders, that is by interlegality”. See also teuBneR (1996); teuBneR (2012).
16 P. BeRMan (2014) proposes a list of the mechanisms through which interaction between legal systems 
takes place: dialectical legal interactions, margins of appreciation, subsidiarity schemes, limited autonomy 
regimes, mutual recognition, safe harbour agreements, pluralist approaches to conflict of laws.
17 slaughteR (2004); DelMas-MaRty (2004-2007).
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to draw sharp dividing lines between legal norms and other social norms, which 
can interact or compete18. 
EU law is part of this worldwide phenomenon of transnational law and legal 
hybridisation. In fact, it is one of the most significant and interesting instances of 
them, given the intensity of the erosion of member States’ sovereignty, the den-
sity of the regulatory framework due to its peculiar institutional setting, and the 
establishment of new mechanisms for the coordination of different systems and 
resolution of conflicts among them.19 The intensity and pervasiveness of integra-
tion within the European Union are such that it is often compared to federalist 
models (which are intrinsically tied to the existence of a State, albeit with a high 
level of decentralisation), but there is no general agreement as to its nature: the 
EU is no longer a purely international organisation, but it is neither a State20; it is 
a kind of “no-man’s land”, where the traditional dichotomy of national law and 
international law does not fully grasp the evolving reality and which produces a 
specific and new kind of law21. 
3. Globalization, governance and the trend to measurement of 
law
The paradigmatic shift related to globalization is evident also in an important 
terminological mutation, from “government” to “governance”, a change which 
implies something essentially different from regulation by the States through tradi-
tional legal means: “governance” is a looser and fuzzier term than “government”, 
18 CaFaggi (2011) 1; WielsCh (2012) 1075; hale, helD (2011).
19 Within Europe an important case of co-ordination and interference is the regime of human rights 
protection as established by the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950 (and the related body of 
case law developed by the European Court of Human Rights), and the corresponding regime of EU law, 
based on the case law of the ECJ and, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, by the EU Charter 
of fundamental rights. According to Art. 6(2) TEU of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is to accede to the ECHR, a 
process that is complex and controversial, due to the difficulty in devising mechanisms of coordination and 
resolution of possible conflicts between the two related but different orders of rules and between the ECtHR 
and the ECJ. The accession process is still under discussion.
20 See WeileR (1999); van geRven (2005).
21 Under classic international law, the solution of conflicts among States is based on territorial criteria. 
On the contrary, the EU (and previously the EC) has from the very outset regulated its relationship with the 
member States according to functional criteria, where sovereignty is apportioned in order to achieve the 
objectives established by the founding Treaties, which have gradually acquired constitutional status. The 
system is based on a complex partition of competences, where the principle of conferral is bent to serve 
new purposes, and is increasingly open-ended and flexible. Clashes are consequently inevitable, since the 
EU and national legal systems are in competition for authority over the same space. Political scientists have 
analysed this phenomenon under the theories of multi-level governance. See piattoni (2010).
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and encompasses different players and different types of rules22. It is the realm 
of soft law, where individuals, groups and countries, rather than being compelled 
by binding rules, perform self-assessment exercises, based on reporting and 
evaluation23. Yet, the pressure to align in these forms of governance is often as 
compelling as in the case of hard law, although the fact that in reality there is 
often not much discretion or leeway is usually not acknowledged. The actors 
also change: instead of institutions bearing political responsibility, the rules of the 
game are defined by experts shielded from immediate political accountability, 
due to their apparently neutral and scientific position. 
Emphasis on governance, conceived as the web of institutions and rules 
that regulate a specific system, often of a transnational character, has been 
particularly strong since the 1990s, in a global context where it is increasingly 
difficult to establish the legitimacy of rule-making and to guarantee rule imple-
mentation. Starting from this period, law is increasingly conceived as a kind 
of engineering instrument, competing in the “market for regulation” with other 
non-legal instruments24, and it is in this moment that the global boom of indica-
tors and rankings started.
Indicators, in the definition given by Davis, Kingsbury and Engle Merry, are 
collections of “rank-ordered data that purport to present the past or projected 
performance of different units. The data are generated through a process that 
simplifies raw data about a complex social phenomenon. The data, in this simpli-
fied and processed form, are capable of being used to compare particular units 
of analysis (such as countries or institutions or corporations), synchronically or 
over time, and to evaluate their performance by reference to one or more stand-
ards”25. They embody a theory of social change, which nevertheless is rarely fully 
spelled out, and works as an implicit and self-explaining assumption. There is a 
large variety of indicators, which can have a different scope of the analysis (eco-
nomic, social, political), geographical reach (national, regional or international), 
aims (information, monitoring, financing, decision-making, reform, etc.), kinds 
of data and sources (surveys, counts, ratios, aggregation of pre-existing data-
bases, mix of quantitative and qualitative information, etc.), the methodologies 
22 The concept of governance has been employed by the World Bank in the 1990s to allow it to plan 
and introduce institutional reforms in Africa. The World Bank’s Statute does not allow it to interfere with 
States’ internal prerogatives, but the loose and generic character of the notion of governance has allowed it 
to partly bypass this limitation, masking the political and ideological character of the interventions (as in the 
“rule of law” projects). The results are mixed, and have often been criticized for a lack of transparency and 
control. See santos (2006), pp. 253-300. On the general features of governance, see Ferrarese (2010).
23 The model of self-assessment and self-regulation was first developed and applied in corporate busi-
ness models and audit systems. 
24 See Davis, kingsBuRy, engle MeRRy (2012(a)), pp. 3-28.
25 Davis, kingsBuRy, engle MeRRy (2012(b)), pp. 73-74.
38 VOLUME III \ n.º 2 \ maio 2019
DOUTRINA
employed to process them. Over time, their use has moved from areas with 
strong economic relevance (development, efficiency, poverty, etc.) to a variety 
of broad social and political issues, stretching from corruption, transparency, to 
justice, human rights and the rule of law26.
There are several drivers of the explosion of indicators27: the need to gath-
er suitable comparable information for a variety of contexts28, the possibility to 
use them to shape and ease decision-making processes where power is dis-
persed or weak, and the suitability to apply them to hold a variety of actors 
accountable29. In the words of anthropologist Sally Engle Merry, “Indicators are 
appealing because they claim to stand above politics, offering rational, technical 
knowledge that is disinterested and the product of expertise. (…) They address 
the desire for unambiguous knowledge, free of political bias.”30 This is parti- 
cularly important in cases where traditional political institutions and procedures 
are weak, because decisions are taken outside the area of control of traditional 
political institutions, as in the case of phenomena related to globalization, where 
both States and international organizations are often unable to provide compre-
hensive regulations. Alternatively, it can be because traditional political institutions 
are perceived to be weak, ineffective, irresponsive, a problem that in recent times 
has become critical in many States, and is also increasingly affecting the status 
of the European Union. In these cases, the possibility to base decisions on ob-
jective, neutral elements can strengthen their legitimacy and minimize criticism 
26 veRsteeg, ginsBuRg (2016), pp. 100-137.
27 Among the rankings that have gained the widest attention in the last decade, both in positive and 
critical terms, particular prominence has been achieved by the Doing Business, published yearly since 2004 
by the World Bank, which analyses a series of elements related to the procedures involved in setting up, 
manage and winding up business in hundreds of States. All the data (which are based on questionnaires 
answered by various kinds of professionals) are processed so as to produce a number that allows the 
ranking of all systems: the higher the position in the ranking, the better the environment for doing business. 
The reports, which have a clear bias in favour of legal reform as an instrument to foster development, have 
gained wide political resonance, and are often taken into account by national governments in deciding 
reform programmes, as well as by private institutions in deciding investment strategies. See Davis, kRuse 
(2007); antoniolli (2012), pp. 459-466. Another ranking that has been very influential is the World Justice 
Project, an international civil society organization established in 2006 in the US (originally sponsored by the 
American Bar Association), which measures the rule of law in 113 countries around the world through a 
composite indicator based on 44 specific indicators, covering issues such as open government, funda-
mental rights, corruption, justice, order and security.
28 In the 20th century a fundamental role in fostering the development and use of global statistics and 
indicators has been played by the United Nations, through the development of internationally homogene-
ous criteria and methods for data gathering and processing, helping States to develop the required skills 
and infrastructures, for instance through the establishment of national governmental statistical offices. The 
UN Statistical Commission (UNSC) has adopted the Fundamental Principles of Official Statistics in 1994 
(reviewed in 2013), which are based on criteria of impartiality, professionalism, scientific principles and 
standards, statistical relevance and utility, reliability, quality and transparency. 
29 See espelanD, vanneBo (2007).
30 engle MeRRy (2016), pp. 3-4.
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and opposition, by-passing the traditional command-and-control methods 
and focusing on problem-solving through consensus-building. This complex 
combination of ideological, pragmatic and instrumental reasons determines the 
success of indicators, and more generally of instruments of measurement and 
quantification, for policy-making and implementation31.
Indicators are the result of a collective process led by networks of actors32, 
and it is very important to take into account the social aspects of the production 
of this kind of scientific knowledge33. The most successful indicators in this world-
wide network are those merging together different counts and ratios, combining 
different sets of data into a single measure, which can be a score or a rank (as 
for instance Doing Business, Human Development Index, Governance Indicator, 
Freedom in the World, World Justice Project, etc.). What is important here is 
not only which sources of data are aggregated (how homogeneous, extensive 
and reliable), but also the way in which these sources are weighted; behind the 
surface of simplicity, they have a high level of complexity, and also of discretion 
and manipulation in defining the mix and balance of their components34. They 
are sponsored by powerful institutions (international or national), are apparent-
ly simple (i.e., they are expressed in sharp and clear scores or rank, allowing 
comparison of large and complex datasets), framed and backed by influential 
and recognized experts (academics or professionals)35, and politically and ideo-
logically uncontested. Also, in order to be successful, it is vital for any indicator 
to gain the attention of the media and the public, which means that often their 
sponsors employ significant effort and resources to disseminate information, 
31 The use of measurement and statistics for governance is not new: modern States employed them 
extensively since the 18th and 19th centuries, particularly to govern colonies abroad and establish the first 
forms of national census. poovey (1998). This led in the 19th century to the establishment of statistics as an 
autonomous discipline, and to the creation of a class of experts specializing in the gathering and processing 
of data. See poRteR (1986); DesRosièRes (2000). 
32 For a thoughtful and comprehensive analysis of quantification as a sociological phenomenon, see 
espelanD, stevens (2007).
33 Also, the “aesthetics of presentation” is highly relevant: formal and graphical elements, in fact, are 
important in developing and spreading knowledge through graphs, maps, boxes, grids, sequences, etc. 
34 Depending on the methods employed for quantification, there are three types of indicators: first- 
-order indicators, which are counts of various kinds of elements (people, income, laws, etc.); second-order 
indicators, which are ratios comparing numbers (e.g., unemployment rates), providing a further, and very 
significant, kind of information by connecting different elements; third-order indicators, which merge differ-
ent counts and ratios. See Engle-Merry (2016), p. 14. For a critical evaluation of composite indicators, see 
saisana, saltelli (2011).
35 A very prominent example is the Human Development Index, which was developed and sponsored 
by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in the 1990s as a simple but more reliable and comprehensive 
measure (in comparison to GNP, gross national product) of development, based on a new idea of develop-
ment related to the capabilities approach of Nobel prize economist Amartya Sen, which takes into consid-
eration elements, such as education and health, that allow individuals to achieve their personal aspirations. 
See sen (1999). 
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consolidate their prestige and foster their use. This process can be quite long, 
and if the quantification exercise is successful, it finally acquires a settled and 
static character, which makes it difficult it to challenge its validity and use36. 
Because of the extensive use of indicators, and their practical and theoret-
ical salience, it is important to ensure that they are not misleading or distorting 
the reality that they aim to portray. This requires transparency in all their compo-
nents: the sources of the data, the methodologies applied to process them, the 
cultural premises and the aims to be achieved37. Also, they need to be backed 
by qualitative analysis, in order to avoid the risk of over-simplification and ho-
mogenization and be able to take into account the specificities of each context 
analysed38. 
4. The magic of numbers and the impact of quantification on 
law 
The apparent neutrality and simplicity of indicators hide a deeply political 
process of selection, processing and application, and requires close critical 
scrutiny39. In order to understand what is at stake when quantification is adopted 
as a strategy for analysis and decision-making, one has to debunk its compo-
nents, deconstructing the “black box”, in order to critically analyse its elements, 
in terms both of input and output40. In order to understand the aim and impact 
of indicators, it is also important to analyse who sponsors their elaboration, who 
produces them, which elements are taken into consideration and which are left 
out, and to whom they are applied41. This is no small task, but it is one that is 
36 See Davis, kingsBuRy, engle MeRRy (2015), pp. 1-24. Indicators allow “uncertainty absorption”: raw 
information is manipulated and transformed, in order to make it accessible and straightforward for deci-
sion-making, eliminating “noises”, ambiguities and gaps.
37 Other relevant elements are: openness and democratization of the creation and production of indi-
cators, through public discussion at the initial stages of the making; enhanced use of qualitative research 
in order to produce global categories that take into consideration local characteristics in the encoding 
process; greater use of counts and ratios, instead of composite indicators; avoidance of speculative or 
weak data; clear warnings about the limits of these instruments and possibility to challenge their validity. 
See engle MeRRy (2016), p. 217. 
38 engle MeRRy (2016), p. 3: “despite the value of numbers for exposing problems and tracking their dis-
tribution, they provide knowledge that is decontextualized, homogenized, and remote from local systems 
of meaning. Indicators risk producing knowledge that is partial, distorted, and misleading”.
39 For a critical assessment of the impact of the use of numbers on governance and individual rights, see 
Supiot (2017); see also vatin (2013).
40 See Davis (2014).
41 An essential role is played by experts that are part of a global élite, and by countries that have a 
well-established tradition of surveys. Once models become established, they tend to be replicated in sub-
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essential in order to be able to understand the policy issues at stake, and the 
limits and compromises that are invariably made in order to produce a compre-
hensive quantifying synthesis.
Lawyers in many parts of the world are ill-equipped to work with the sophis-
ticated mathematical and statistical tools that are applied to produce indica-
tors and rankings, because their education and training is traditionally based on 
qualitative methods. As a consequence, the issue of measurement of law has 
received until now only marginal attention by lawyers, possibly with the excep-
tions of the U.S., where a significant part of legal academia has a background in 
quantitative sciences. Yet, this field is of the utmost importance for all lawyers, 
both from a practical and theoretical point of view. The explosion of empiri-
cal research measuring various social phenomena, among which also law, has 
radically changed the types of analysis and consequently the use of these in-
puts in the last decades42. These features explain why the spread of quantitative 
measurement of law through indicators and rankings has been rightly termed 
as an “electroshock”43, calling into question all basic elements of the discipline, 
although until now reactions have been rather modest and selective.
These instruments have been initially developed mainly by social scientists 
(often economists), together with statisticians, a group of people that in ironic 
terms have been termed “wannabe lawyers”44: they work with legal rules, but 
are often not legal experts, using methods foreign to law and straining the legal 
concepts and categories employed45. The different epistemological stance of the 
disciplines that are involved in the drafting and application of these instruments 
has important implications for the premises (both explicit and implicit), the con-
tent and the results of the analysis that are performed46. The way in which law is 
sequent quantification exercises, generating both “expertise inertia” and “data inertia”, or, as economists 
would say, they establish path-dependent patterns.
42 For a general overview of the impact of quantitative analysis in law, see the contributions in Cane, 
kRitzeR (2010). New promising fields of research relate to the study of legal complexity (Ruhl, Katz (2015)), 
the relationship of machine learning and the law, (suRDen (2014)), and of artificial intellingence (AI) and the 
law (ConRaD, BRanting (2018)).
43 Association Henry Capitant (2006), p. 126, referring to the Doing Business Report.
44 gaMBaRo (2011), pp. 49-69.
45 Davis, kRuse (2007), p. 1096: “One of the remarkable ironies of contemporary legal scholarship is that 
some of the most ambitious and influential research on the relationship between law, on the one hand, and 
economic outcomes, on the other, is being produced outside the legal academy”. 
46 For example, the cultural model underlying the Doing Business is that of the new institutional eco-
nomics, which, starting from the work of Nobel laureate Douglas North, analyses the role of institutions on 
economic development. A prominent group of scholars working at the Universities of Chicago and Harvard 
(the so-called LLVS: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, Vishny) considers that there is a direct causal 
link between legal reform and economic development: DJankov, glaeseR, la poRta, lopez-De-silanes, shleiF-
eR (2003), p. 595. This stance has been widely criticized by other scholars, challenging the existence of a 
causal link (which should rather be considered a correlation), and emphasizing the relevance of other fac-
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defined and applied in this kind of analysis calls into question the fundamental 
epistemological and methodological basis of law, forcing it to review and update 
them, taking up the challenge of the relationship between law and the other 
sciences, particularly social sciences, but also statistics and informatics. In order 
to do that, one needs to answer questions such as: Is it possible to develop legal 
analysis, particularly comparative ones, using quantitative data and methods? If 
yes, what are the limits, and which methodologies should be employed? Taking 
this challenge seriously could help law, particularly comparative law, to critically 
review its taxonomies, methods and aims (such as the role of functionalism, the 
categories of legal families and the working of legal transplants) in light of the 
fundamental changes that over time have substantially changed the framework 
of this discipline, both in theoretical and practical terms47.
The cultural matrix in which indicators and rankings have been developed 
and applied relates to the modern irresistible lure of quantitative analysis, “the 
magic of numbers”48: “Quantification is seductive. It offers concrete, numerical 
information that allows for easy comparison and ranking (…) It organizes and 
simplifies knowledge, facilitating decision making in the absence of more de-
tailed, contextual information (…) Numbers convey an aura of objective truth 
and scientific authority despite the extensive interpretative work that goes into 
their construction.”49 These twofold characteristics explain the success of quan-
tification, particularly at times, as today, when objectivity and “hard” scientific 
characters are highly valued.
Quantification requires universal categories that apply across a variety of 
different situations and phenomena, allowing them to be bundled together, in 
this way providing simple and accessible knowledge of complex social phe-
nomena. These classifications must be mutually exclusive and encompassing, in 
order to allow the encodement of all data, thereby establishing boundaries. The 
tors (cultural, social, geographical, etc.); see for instance BeRkoWitz, pistoR, RiChaRD (2003), 310-323; sieMs 
(2007), p. 52. The new comparative economics is at the basis also of the theory of “legal origins”, according 
to which the efficiency of legal rules depends on the kind of system that generated them, either common 
law or civil law. According to the analysis, common law systems invariable display more efficient legal solu-
tions: la poRta, lopez-De-silanes, shleiFeR (2008), p. 285. Both lines of research point to the possibility (and 
desirability) of a general model applicable in all contexts the (in)famous “one size fits all”. This has aroused a 
number of strong critical reactions, in particular by France, considered as the paradigmatic civil law system: 
in 2007, the Fondation pour le droit continental was established, with the aim to foster knowledge and use 
of the French/civil law model; unfortunately, the same apologetic and tautological kinds of arguments are 
used here. See Association Henry Capitant (2006). See antoniolli (2012), pp. 467-478.
47 See American Journal of Comparative Law, Symposium on Legal Origins, 2009, 57, particularly the 
contributions by R. Michaels, V. Grosswald Curran, J. Reitz.
48 See antoniolli (2017), pp. 37-50. For a broad analysis of the modern impact of quantification in sci-
ence and public life, see Porter (1995). 
49 engle MeRRy (2016), p. 1, who defines quantification as “the use of numbers to describe social phe-
nomena in countable and commensurable terms”.
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building of these universal categories is a most sensitive and relevant element 
of the process of quantification: classifying social phenomena into neat catego-
ries implies important choices on how to define taxonomies, and consequently 
what to leave out. This is not a neutral selection, since it implies taking out many 
relevant contextual aspects, and forces simplification over complexity, and ho-
mogeneity over variety. While this can be a useful and necessary operation, one 
should never forget that it requires choices, selection and interpretation, which 
are value-ridden activities. The aura of objectivity and simplicity is constructed, 
not intrinsic. Also, the fact that these universal categories are sufficiently general 
to be applicable to different contexts makes it possible to commensurate and 
compare, i.e., to create equivalence across different units by finding common 
elements, ruling out differences among situations that can be very different50.
In evaluating the role of measurement in law, a fundamental issue to be 
discussed is the possibility to use quantitative concept in law, particularly com-
parative law. In a series of seminal works51, Antonio Gambaro has applied to this 
field the classical classification of concepts into classificatory, comparative and 
quantitative52. He notes the irresistible appeal of quantitative data, due to the 
fact that they are more specific than qualitative data, and they are not prone to 
idiosyncratic evaluations. Yet, without a comparative context, quantitative data 
often lack a meaningful content: the datum that Mount Everest is 8.848 m high 
is far less meaningful than the comparison that Mount Everest is 8.848 m, while 
Mount Kilimanjaro is 5.895 m high, i.e., the first is higher than the latter. So, what 
is really important is the synergy between quantitative and comparative data53, 
and in fact this is exactly what the most popular indicators do, offering rankings 
based on quantitative measurements (whether the measurement is accurate 
and meaningful is a different matter)54.
50 For a very thoughtful analysis of commensuration, see espelanD, stevens (1998), according to whom 
“commensuration is no mere technical process but a fundamental feature of social life. (…) It is symbolic, 
inherently interpretative, deeply political, and too important to be left implicit” (p. 315).
51 gaMBaRo (2011), pp. 49-69; A. gaMBaRo, Misurare il diritto, Annuario di diritto comparato e di studi 
legislativi, 2012, p. 17-47; A. Gambaro, Misurare il diritto – Misurare il diritto – Parte seconda, in L. Antoniolli, 
G. Benacchio, R. Toniatti (eds), Le nuove frontiere della comparazione – Atti del primo congresso nazionale 
SIRD, Trento, 2012.
52 heMpel (1967).
53 See gaMBaRo (2012(b)), p. 3: “qualunque funzione dei dati quantitativi non è dissociabile dalla dimen-
sione comparative, perché senza il contesto comparativo i dati quantitativi riferiti a qualunque aspetto della 
realtà sociale, ma finalizzati ad agevolare scelte di tipo giuridico, perdono significato”.
54 This truth is told in the streetlight story, where a drunkard, questioned by a policeman staring at him 
and asking about what is he looking for on all fours in the night, replies that he is looking for his housekeys; 
at the following question on whether he is sure that he has lost his keys in that spot, he candidly replies 
that no, he has lost them somewhere else, but in that spot under the streetlight there is much more light. 
Transposed in our context, this means that quantitative analysis may convey a much “brighter” picture of 
the data, but if the data do not cover all relevant elements of the phenomenon under analysis, they may be 
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Nevertheless, the synergy between quantification and comparative law is 
problematic: applying quantitative methodologies in the field of comparative law 
implies a fundamental challenge to existing concepts and methods: compara-
tive law traditionally applies structural models55, which analyze the connections 
among the elements of a system (legal formants), both hidden (cryptotypes) and 
explicit, focusing on the law in action. This kind of analysis does not lend itself 
to quantitative measurement, although it is capable of providing an exhaustive 
and reliable description of a system. Focusing only on measurable elements is a 
fundamental choice, and one that comes at a price. As a famous saying usually 
credited to Albert Einstein states, “Not everything that counts can be counted, 
and not everything that can be counted counts”. 
Moreover, there is a fundamental problem that concerns law, not only com-
parative law: as we have seen before, quantitative analysis requires data to be 
ascribed to predefined classes, which imply a system of classification that is 
defined a priori in a coherent and rigid way: each datum must correspond to 
one and only one class. If a class is not clearly defined, it becomes impossible to 
unilaterally define a correspondence of all elements, and this will lead to unrelia-
ble results56. This method has never been applied in law, and for good reasons: 
law has always developed and applied concepts and categories of a flexible 
nature, which allow the classification of facts and data, but at the same time 
can be adapted to changing social phenomena. As a consequence, the choice 
between quantitative analysis and traditional legal analysis poses a dilemma: in 
order to perform a sound quantitative analysis, categories must be rigid and ab-
solutely precise; at the same time, rigid classifications invariably lead to leaving 
out elements which are relevant for a comprehensive and fine-tuned analysis of 
complex social phenomena57.
less useful than a “shadier” analysis. It does not rule out the possibility of quantitative analysis, but requires 
awareness about the possibilities and limits of different methods of analysis. A related problem is that 
of the availability of comprehensive and reliable data, which is crucial for all kinds of empirical analysis. 
Missing, incomplete or heterogeneous data, as well as unsuitable statistical processing techniques may 
invalidate the results of the analysis. The gathering, selection and classification of data is an expensive and 
time-consuming activity; therefore, it can be considered as a public good, whose production requires public 
intervention and control. See ulen (2012), p. 49 ss.
55 gaMBaRo, saCCo (2018); saCCo, Rossi (2015). For a thoughtful analysis of the methods applied in com-
parative law (and a plea for methodological pluralism), see Resta (2017).
56 The paradigmatic example of the transforming power of classification and taxonomies is Linnaeus’ 
binomial nomenclature, a classification system that is at the basis of modern systems of classification of 
organisms: linneaus (2003). 
57 The conflicting nature of legal methods and quantifying methods is emphasized also by espelanD, 
vanneBo (2007), p. 39.
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Behind this methodological choice lurks a much more fundamental question 
about the kind of knowledge that any science aims to produce58. Some sciences 
focus on specific, individual phenomena, aiming at analysis that are as accurate 
and detailed as possible. The other pole to these “individualizing” sciences are 
“generalizing” sciences, whose main aim is to produce general knowledge and 
models that apply to a variety of phenomena59. This distinction is often ascribed 
respectively to humanities and natural sciences, but this is a simplistic and not 
fully accurate classification; social sciences are scattered all along this spectrum, 
with innumerable variations over time: while economics has from the very be-
ginning made a clear choice for generalizing models and quantitative analysis, 
other disciplines, such as sociology and political science, have swung between 
generalizing and individualizing models, and between quantitative and qualita-
tive methodologies. Others, among which law, anthropology and history, have 
predominantly (although not exclusively) focused on individualizing models and 
qualitative methods60. From a theoretical point of view, finding a working balance 
and trade-off between quantitative and qualitative analysis in the production of 
knowledge is a crucial epistemological problem of all social sciences.
This fundamental epistemological element is reflected in the methodologies 
that are applied by sciences. In a seminal essay of the 1940s on the role of social 
sciences, Karl Polanyi emphasized that while all sciences have a fundamental 
element in common, i.e., the human interest to know man’s surrounding envi-
ronment, they irreversibly diverge in the methods they use to investigate reality61, 
and this feature implies that they cannot be aggregated into a unity. Therefore, 
aims, scope and methods of sciences are issues that cannot be severed, being 
inextricably intertwined. 
The choice of methods, quantitative or qualitative (or a mix thereof), there-
fore depends on the fundamental aims of each science62: if the core aim is the 
58 See latouR (1987).
59 ginzBuRg (2000), 158-209. The Galilean model is at the core of this kind of science, based on meas-
urement and replicability of phenomena.
60 Nevertheless, it is possible to conceive law as a science that works on general models that are appli-
cable across time and space, similarly to what has been done in other social sciences. This is for example 
the choice underlying the studies on legal transplants based on the so-called “one size fits all” model: once 
a well-working model (concerning rules, institutions, or both) is defined, it is claimed that it is possible to 
apply it in different contexts, and this should lead to similar results. For the first path-breaking work on legal 
transplants, see Watson (1974). 
61 polanyi (2013), pp. 147-157, according to whom “Il metodo è la chiave per comprendere ciò che 
la scienza può fare e non può fare (…). E’ il metodo che differenzia ciò che viene selezionato come tema 
proprio di una scienza e ciò che viene eliminato da essa, in quanto oggetto ‘non scientifico’” (p. 148).
62 Quantitative analysis of social phenomena can work ex post, in order to evaluate existing situations, or 
be structured to work ex ante, in order to generate decisional models. Moreover, any analysis may be purely 
descriptive, or instead it may be normative, aiming at modifying the phenomenon it portrays. While these 
kinds of analysis are clearly different at the theoretical level, in practice they are often blurred and mixed. 
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analysis and classification of the specific features of an individual phenomenon, 
the accuracy of the description is much more important than the ability to gen-
erate general models and predictions. If, on the contrary, the fundamental aim of 
a science is to establish a framework of features generating models that apply 
to categories of phenomena, able to apply to situations across space and time 
(and also to generate a falsifiable forecast), then the gathering of fine-grained 
details is a hindrance, rather than an asset. In the case of law, the choice that 
has traditionally been made for an individualizing epistemology is first and fore-
most axiological, and only as a consequence methodological: Western law has 
historically been considered a discipline concerned with the rules and institu-
tions of specific societies, rather than with universal general models (although of 
course similarities and recurrent patterns have been detected and classified). Yet 
law and all individualistic sciences face a dilemma: their epistemological status 
is considered weak, but is able to reach accurate and relevant results; turning 
to generalizing (and also quantitative) analyses would strengthen their scientific 
standing, making them more rigorous, but could produce analyses that are less 
significant. Finding a suitable balance between detail and generalization is cru-
cial63, and goes at the root of a science’s premises, scope and aims.
Finally, another element of crucial importance is that law, and social sciences 
in general, faces a fundamental problem that is not of immediate concern for 
natural sciences, namely the issue of the prescriptive dimension of the analysis. 
In all social sciences knowledge cannot be separated from their aims, which are 
in turn related to the underlying values shaping human conduct (among which 
also scientific research)64. This issue has nothing to do with the accuracy or 
precision of methodologies, but rather with the fundamental features of social 
sciences themselves: in order to be objective, i.e., scientific, social sciences 
should expunge values, which are intrinsically subjective; yet, if they do, they 
lose their very raison d’être, because the aims of knowledge of social sciences 
is exactly related to the kind of societies that we live in (or would want to live 
in)65. Consequently, scientific analysis in social sciences cannot be severed from 
Yet, it is important to keep these distinct, since they have different premises and different implications: 
descriptive, predictive or prescriptive analysis are very different exercises.
63 Ginzburg describes this dilemma with an oxymoron, “flexible rigour” (p. 192). This feature is typical 
of mute forms of knowledge, characterized by uniqueness of data: see saCCo (1995), pp. 455-467; saCCo 
(2015).
64 Values are of course relevant also for natural sciences, but only when scientific discoveries have to be 
transposed in a specific course of action; they do not define the research questions and the way in which 
these are addressed.
65 polanyi (2013), p. 157: “L’uso delle scienze sociali non è un problema tecnico della scienza. E’ il prob-
lema di attribuire alla società umana un significato, che permetta di preservare la sovranità dell’uomo sugli 
strumenti della vita, ivi inclusa la scienza”.
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axiological considerations: values are part of the analysis; if they are removed, 
the analysis is simply maimed. This dilemma between objectivity and subjectivity 
cannot be overcome, but should be openly acknowledged as an unavoidable 
element of social sciences: rather than removing values, scientists should be 
candid about how they define and apply values in their analyses, making them 
open to scrutiny and criticism. Normativity is an unavoidable element, whether 
this is disclosed or undisclosed. 
This issue is relevant to the problem that we are investigating here. Forms 
of governance that are based on measurement, such as indicators, produce 
both a knowledge effect, i.e., a specific kind of information, and a governance 
effect, i.e., the possibility to use them for regulation, control and accountability. 
They are the product of a specific “indicator culture”, i.e., “a set of techniques 
and practices applied within specific situations (…), a set of cultural practices, 
techniques, and assumptions about knowledge production embedded in par-
ticular institutional and bureaucratic settings”66. This kind of culture emphasizes 
the value of numerical data as a superior form of knowledge, one that not only 
provides more significant information, because it allows measurement and com-
parison, but which is also objective and neutral. The relationship and possible 
clash between quantification as a neutral exercise and the role of values in social 
sciences analysis is a fundamental element, one that is increasingly important in 
today’s world.
5. The pitfall and failure of comprehensive harmonization of 
European private law
In the previous parts of this work we have analysed both the context and 
the drivers of the explosion of indicators and other forms of governance through 
measurement, and their link to the process of globalization and the development 
of transnational law. We have then analysed some of the crucial implications of 
this phenomenon for law, both in its theoretical and practical dimension. In the 
last part of this work, we will try to apply this framework of analysis to the Euro-
pean Union context. We will first analyse the development and failure of some 
major efforts for comprehensive harmonization of private law at the EU level. 
Finally, in the last paragraph we will focus on the new developments in the area 
of EU private regulatory law, and try to carve out some relevant elements for a 
research agenda in relation to the use of quantification instruments67.
66 engle MeRRy (2016), p. 9.
67 For a general view of European private law, see Bussani, WeRRo (2009); BRoWnsWoRD, niglia, MiCklitz, 
et al. (2011); sChulze, sChulte-nölke (2011); tWigg-FlesneR (2010).
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The European integration process is a particularly relevant example of trans-
national law68, and is consequently a good testing ground of the impact and 
transformative role of quantification and measurement. Its focus was from the 
start on economic integration, revolving around the core of the common/internal 
market based on the four fundamental freedoms, which in the mind of the found-
ing fathers should in the long run lead to political integration, through a spill-over 
mechanism69. Due to this fundamental choice, the EU economic constitution has 
always been heavily oriented towards market values, and while it is certainly true 
that, over time, social concerns have increasingly made their way into the consti-
tutional fabric of the EU legal system, the predominance of market values seems 
to be part of the DNA of the EU, with a strong emphasis on functionalism70.
EU law has been originally influenced by a traditional vision of the economic 
constitution in which the role of the State was meant to guarantee a level play-
ing field for market forces and the individual freedom of private actors, which 
implied that private and public/constitutional law were to be strictly separated, 
and private law (with its central pillars, private autonomy and freedom of con-
tract) had to be shielded from political influence71. While at the national level this 
was gradually eroded in the 20th century, it had lasting consequences in EU law, 
strengthening the technocratic features of law-making in the crucial area of the 
internal market, isolating it to a large extent from open public “constitutional” 
debate, confining what does not fit into this picture in isolated specialized fields. 
This narrow European focus on the internal market as the fundamental build-
ing-block of the European economic constitution is not in line with national private 
law, which in the member States is fundamentally linked with its social, cultural 
and economic identity. As a consequence, the different conceptions that social 
justice embodied in national legal systems cannot be merged into the embryonic 
and partial notion of justice related to the internal market that is developing within 
68 For a comprehensive discussion of the meaning of private law, privatization and globalization both in 
a historical and comparative dimension, see MiChaels, Jansen (2006), p. 873, according to whom it is “clear 
that private law requires rethinking, especially with regard to its connection to the state”. See also JoeRges 
(2005); Jansen, MiChaels (2008); CaRuso (2006) 1.
69 The so-called “Europe des petits pas”. In the words of Schumann, one of the fathers of the European 
Community, “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through con-
crete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. (…) The pooling [of coal and steel production] 
should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first 
step in the federation of Europe”: Schuman declaration, 9 May 1950 (http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-in-
formation/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration/index_en.htm).
70 See stuDy gRoup on soCial JustiCe in euRopean pRivate laW (2004) 653; poiaRes MaDuRo (1998); poiaRes 
MaDuRo (1999). 
71 This is the model of German ordo-liberalism. See BoehM (1989).
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the EU72. Here, as in other areas, the EU works as a multi-level system, where 
the European level should complement but not pre-empt the national ones73 (as 
the motto “united in diversity” symbolizes).
The uneasy relationship between European and national private law is epito-
mized in the thorny question of the legal competences of the EU, an apparently 
technical issue which hides crucial political stakes. In fact, while the apparently 
unavoidable link between EU private law and the internal market has been very 
often criticized as being too one-sided74, it has very strong structural policy rea-
sons, because the internal market remains the most solid basis for comprehen-
sive legal harmonization in the area of private law75.
As long as EU legal interventions are limited to rules related to specific ar-
eas of private law, this tension is felt to a limited extent, since the general legal 
framework is still provided by national laws. Yet, since the 1980s, in the wake 
of the Single European Act and its renewed emphasis on the central role of 
the internal market programme, the process of Europeanisation has increasingly 
affected private law and expanded significantly in the subsequent decades, rais-
ing a comprehensive discussion on the aims, scope and content of European 
private law76.
The high point of this process was the debate on the need and feasibility of a 
European civil code, an idea developed by the EU institutions in a rather opaque 
and non-linear way since the late 1980s and 1990s77. After the first political 
72 For a comprehensive analysis of the characteristics of the different social justice conceptions in Euro-
pean private law, see MiCklitz (2011); WilhelMsson (2004) 712; nogleR, ReiFneR (2014). 
73 See, e.g., JoeRges (2007), 311-327.
74 niglia, (2006) 401, who criticizes the focus on formal rules and systematisation, and the lack of anal-
ysis of the relevance of the context and the actors involved. See also niglia (2013). 
75 The EU institutions consider that the right legal basis for private law harmonization is art. 114 TFEU, 
i.e., the internal market, on the basis of the standard argument that harmonization of private law in the EU 
is linked to the need to overcome the obstacles to the working of the internal market. This raises several 
problems: first of all, reference to the internal market as a legal basis requires proof of the existence of 
obstacles that are actual and not merely potential (as the Court of Justice has forcefully stated), but this is 
problematic for an intervention which covers such a broad area as private law. Some claim that the right 
legal basis should be article 352 TFEU, which grants the EU the power to regulate areas where there is no 
specific competence, if this is required in order to attain a EU objective. Yet, the issue of the relationship 
between EU and national private law (and whether EU law should or not pre-empt national law) requires an 
open discussion of the aim of harmonization. According to many economic and legal scholars, it is impos-
sible to calculate with reasonable accuracy the costs of harmonizing or unifying private law in comparison to 
the costs of legal diversity, because of the complexity of the calculus, and also because, in fact, uniformity 
of law does not necessarily lead to legal certainty. Smits (2011), p. 153 et seq.; sMits (2005).
76 An aspect that is increasingly debated is the link between the proposed private law instruments and 
fundamental rights, an issue which has an important constitutional dimension. See Brueggemeir, Colombi 
Ciacchi, Comandè (2010); kosta (2010) 409 ff. 
77 Collins (2004), p. 649, criticizes the opaqueness of the Commission position (e.g., in using the term 
“non-sector-specific measures” when “in truth, once stripped of its distracting multiple hyphenation, is code 
for nothing less than a European Code” (p. 649). While favouring the adoption of a European Civil Code, he 
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statements by the European Parliament, the task was taken up by the Commis-
sion, which at the beginning of the 2000s entrusted a large network of scholars 
with the task of drafting a Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), out of 
which a political Common Frame of Reference (CFR) should be then adopted78. 
The DCFR, published in 2009, was a code-like instrument containing ‘best solu-
tions’ (i.e., common rules), as well as coherent core definitions of legal concepts 
and terminology, which covered most of private patrimonial law79. It met with 
strong opposition from several member States, stakeholders and lawyers, and 
was finally dropped. The EU consequently scaled down its ambition, and in 2011 
the Commission proposed a Common European Sales Law, CESL80, which had 
a similarly negative fate. Finally, at the end of 2014, the Commission decided to 
move back to the traditional model of piecemeal intervention on specific aspects 
of contract law related to the Digital Single Market81. Ten years after, it seems 
that the whole process is back to the start.
considers that “a European civil code will represent a statement of the political values that will govern the 
basic principles of social justice in the market economy. Such a statement of the ideals of a social market 
economy requires both democratic endorsement and regulatory legitimacy. The institutions of the Europe-
an Union (…) are not designed, and were not intended to be competent, to engage in the construction of 
such a political settlement” (p. 650). Rather than being unbalanced, the European economic constitution 
is incomplete, and this implies a risk of “a structural tilt towards an insufficiently regulated order”: Collins 
(2009), p. 82. See also hesselink (2006); CaRuso (2004) 751.
78 The focus of the Commission was on general contract law, considered as the core of private law re-
lated to the internal market. On the contrary, both the EP Resolutions and the DCFR had a broader scope, 
referring to the whole of private patrimonial law. This frequent swing between contract law and private law 
is a sign of the tension concerning the optimal scope of harmonization at the EU level.
79 Study Group on a European Civil Code, Research Group on the Existing EC Private Law (2009); http://
ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/civil/docs/dcfr_outline_edition_en.pdf. A preliminary version was published in 
2007. For an analysis of the general impact of the DCFR, see MiCklitz, CaFaggi (2010). For a critical assess-
ment, see ziMMeRMann, Jansen (2010) 98; antoniolli, FioRentini, (2011); antoniolli, FioRentini, goRDley (2010) 
343. There has been an important discussion about what kind of fundamental principles are embodied in 
the DCFR: only in the final version a list of principles was added, a long and fuzzy list, without any critera for 
solving possible conflicts among different principles. See Fauvarque-Cosson, Mazeaud (2008). For a critical 
evaluation, see hesselink (2011), p. 59.
80 Commission proposal of October 2011 for a Regulation on a Common European Sales law, 
COM(2011)635 final (11/10/2011). For a general analysis of the proposal, see R. sChulze (2012). The 
CESL would have introduced in the national contract laws of the member States a second voluntary (opt-
in) regime for transborder sales and related services in both business-to-consumer (B2C) contracts and 
business-to-business (B2B) contracts. The proposal was a clear retrenchment from the previous plan to 
harmonize private law, or at least general contract law, of the DCFR. See antoniolli (2015), p. 205.
81 After having decided to withdraw the CESL proposal in December 2014, the Commission focused 
on e-commerce contracts in the Digital Single Market, significantly downgrading its harmonization plans. In 
2015, it presented two proposals of Directives covering e-contracts, respectively digital sales contracts and 
contracts for the supply of digital content: Proposal for a Directive on certain aspects concerning contracts 
for the online and other distance sales of goods, COM (2015) 635 final, December 9th, 2015, modified in 
October 2017, COM(2017) 637 final, October 31st, 2017; Proposal for a Directive on certain aspects con-
cerning contracts for the supply of digital content, COM (2015) 634 final, December 9th, 2015.
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Why did this happen? All in all, it comes as no surprise that the great expec-
tations placed in the drafting of a Common Frame of Reference as a milestone 
towards a European civil code have led to utterly disappointing results in terms 
of legislative achievements, because the tension between European private law 
and national private laws cannot be solved by proposing a brand-new, compre-
hensive European Civil Code modelled on the national ones82.
The events in the last decades have proved that the idea of building a uni-
tary European identity through highly symbolic and comprehensive instruments 
is unsuited to the pluralist and multi-level structure of the EU. This is plastically 
evidenced by the similar unfortunate fate of the two “grand projects” of the 21st 
century83, the European Constitution of 2004 (which was meant to mark a brand 
new phase in the European integration process, openly merging political and 
economic integration84, and failed to be ratified due to the negative results of the 
referenda held in France and The Netherlands) and the European Civil code, the 
twin to a constitution in the sphere of private law, defining the fundamental legal 
values and principles for horizontal relations in a society85.
6. Law and measurement in European private regulatory law – 
Sketches for a research agenda
While comprehensive models of harmonization of private law in Europe are 
in crisis, another form of European private law is developing in different quarters, 
82 While a codification process necessarily requires the work of a solid legal doctrine in order to define 
common concepts, categories and rules, the premises of a codification process pertain to the political 
realm. The failed saga of the European Civil code has weakened simultaneously the political legitimacy of 
the EU institutions and the technical legitimacy of legal doctrine, because no one was doing what it was 
pretending to do, and no one was doing the job they should have been doing. As Hesselink writes, “After 
decades of ‘permissive consensus’ vis-à-vis the technocratic construction of a European Community by 
an élite, the identity of Europe has finally become a highly political subject”: hesselink (2004) 675. See also 
kenneDy (2001) 7. In spite of this, the impressive comparative work involved in the drafting of the DCFR has 
two lasting effects: the establishment of a large network of scholars that share methods and views, and its 
future impact on legal education. 
83 See MiCklitz (2010), pp. 109-142; antoniolli (2014), p. 75. 
84 In fact, the content of the Treaty was not completely in line with the highly symbolic move towards a 
“Constitution”, a term which clearly refers to the notion of a state. This is clear when comparing the rules 
contained in the Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in 2009: in spite of the com-
pletely different form, the content is virtually the same. See zilleR (2007). 
85 Although the failure of the European Constitution was hardly perceived as a relevant event as far as 
private law harmonization was concerned, on the contrary it deeply affected the whole European integration 
process, marking an entrenchment of member States, and growing skepticism against further expansion of 
EU competences and powers, which deeply affected the debate about the necessity and viability of a Civil 
code.
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a new embryonic system defined by Micklitz as “regulatory private law”86. It has 
a mixed character between private autonomy and public regulatory intervention, 
and covers important areas such as consumer law, discrimination law, regu-
lated services (financial and insurance services, services related to networks, 
etc.), unfair commercial practices, public procurement, competition, State aid, 
standardisation87. This body of rules has a vertical and horizontal component: 
vertically, it consists of a series of specific bodies of sectoral rules (e.g., energy 
law, financial services, etc.) that are considered as generally self-sufficient, both 
from the point of view of law-making and law enforcement88, and tends to dis-
place national regimes. Horizontally, it fosters harmonization of national rules 
through mechanisms such as mutual recognition, country of origin principle and 
maximum harmonization of selected aspects of general private law, which have 
to be fitted into national systems of private law, often generating frictions and 
inconsistencies89.
European private regulatory law transforms the traditional autonomy of pri-
vate law, re-orienting it towards a functional relation to the market, based on a 
self-sufficient body of rules isolated from national private laws and centred on the 
fundamental tenets of market freedoms and competition90. In this setting, private 
autonomy is heavily regulated, in order to dismantle barriers impeding access to 
the market. Protective mechanisms for weaker parties (right to information, duty 
of transparency), coupled with specific remedies (such as right of withdrawal, 
collective redress mechanisms and ADR91) are also instrumental to guaranteeing 
the working of internal market. 
This body of laws is underpinned by a peculiar notion of justice, defined 
by Micklitz as “access justice”92, that does not aim at social protection through 
86 See MiCklitz (2009) 3. See also puRhagen, Rott (2014). 
87 MiCklitz, svetiev, CoMpaRato (2014), p. 81: “the piecemeal and fragmentary intervention of EU law in the 
domain of private law has had ‘unforeseen and unforeseeable ripple effects, producing various experiments 
of a hybrid nature in both dispute resolution mechanisms and procedures and in the embedding of private 
regime rule-making into alternative (in the sense of non-legislative) but still publicly-minded structures or 
processes. (…). Codification efforts may only further obscure this profound diversity and on-going experi-
mentation. It seems that there is little need for ex ante coherence in the form of further codifications and a 
burning need for ex post coherence by way of monitoring.’”
88 Co-regulation and self-regulation are forms in which not only public, but also private entities can es-
tablish rules. Similarly, regulatory agencies and self-regulatory bodies also involve both public and private 
actors.
89 This is the case for consumer law, unfair commercial practices, anti-discrimination law.
90 See MiCklitz (2014), pp. 251-274. According to Micklitz, the interaction of ERPL and national law can 
have four different forms: intrusion and substitution, conflict and resistance, hybridization, convergence (pp. 
272-274). 
91 Both collective redress and ADR tend to move away from traditional judicial enforcement, towards 
administrative and private enforcement.
92 MiCklitz (2011(a)); Id., (2011(b)).
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redistributive mechanisms, as the traditional notions of distributive justice of na-
tional legal systems, but rather guarantees the right to access goods and ser-
vices, and the right to protection against discrimination, a hybrid combination 
between distributive justice and libertarian allocative justice.
European private regulatory law often employs new modes of governance93, 
a development that is linked to several factors, such as: the need to regulate 
complex problems under conditions of uncertainty; the need to adjust irreduc-
ible diversity among national systems; the will of the EU to take action in areas 
where it has limited or non-existing competence (also in relation to the subsidi-
arity requirement); the desire to increase legitimacy of EU action through social 
dialogue. It applies a variety of instruments (like co-regulation, standard setting, 
etc.), related to the specific features of the sectors involved94, that move along 
a continuum between uniformity and flexibility, allowing variable degrees of de-
viation in the national systems. Their features and effects have to be assessed 
against the benchmark of the Community method, which defines the traditional 
law-making procedure, balancing the role of the EU institutions and the member 
States. In fact, the interaction of the Community method and these new forms of 
governance – and their differences in rule-making, rule implementation, control, 
and the different actors and procedures involved – often causes friction95.
These new models of EU governance are linked to the internal market and 
its economization drive96; they set new methods of control and validity, and imply 
an important political shift in the production and implementation of rules97. This is 
particularly clear in those areas related to economic and social integration where 
the competences of the EU do not allow for harmonization, or limit its scope. 
In these areas a variety of soft law instruments has been developed to foster 
convergence, based on knowledge-sharing, mutual learning, and exchange of 
93 Commission, European Governance: A White Paper, 25th July 2001, COM (2001) 428 fin.: “The Union 
must renew the Community method by following a less top-down approach and complementing the EU’s 
policy tools more effectively with non-legislative instruments” (p. 4). Nevertheless, the Commission points 
out that these instruments “must not dilute the achievement of common objectives or the political respon-
sibility of the Institutions”, and “should not be used when legislative action under the Community method is 
possible” (p. 22). See sChaRpF (2001).
94 See sCott, tRuBek, (2002), pp. 1-18, who list several of them: participation and power-sharing; 
multi-level integration (which requires dialogue and coordination of public and private actors); diversity 
and decentralisation; extended deliberation among stakeholders; flexibility and revisability through soft law 
instruments; experimentation and knowledge creation, often combined with multilateral surveillance. 
95 This friction can be expressed in binary terms: hierarchy v. network, hard law v. soft law, public insti-
tutions v. private actors, judicial review v. accountability, rules v. standards.
96 The link between economic integration and commensuration is emphasized also by espelanD, stevens 
(1998), p. 325: “Commensuration makes possible precise comparisons across vast cultural and geograph-
ical distances that allow transactions fundamental to global markets”.
97 New forms of governance are essentially related to procedural controls, such as transparency, partic-
ipation and accountability. See CaFaggi, MuiR-Watt (2009); CaFaggi (2006). 
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good practices. Behind the rhetoric of neutrality, these mechanisms of cognitive 
convergence through knowledge production and diffusion have important po-
litical implications98. For example, benchmarking is increasingly used in the EU 
as a method for comparing, assessing and influencing specific sectors99, and 
essentially allows to force convergence even in situations where member States 
retain competence, by setting common targets and providing evaluation tools. 
Moreover, quantification of political objectives and translation of statistical data 
into action-oriented indicators, which is characteristic of these forms of soft gov-
ernance, change the forms of accountability and control, moving it away from 
the traditional political arena100 and deepening the technocratic features of the 
European Union. 
The paradigmatic changes that we have shortly described are not only gradu- 
ally changing some fundamental features of European private law, but of the very 
role of law in the European integration process. “Integration through law”101, the 
hallmark of European integration for many decades, envisaged law as a powerful 
instrument to achieve harmonization, first of all economic harmonization. Political 
choices were lurking in the background, but were rarely fully spelled out. In some 
sense, law was pulling itself by its bootstraps. Yet, in the current epoch, marked 
by growing resistance towards further sweeping harmonization and a retrench-
ment towards State control, there is an urgent need to reinstate the missing link 
between law and political choices in the European Union. Law, using Polanyi’s, 
terminology, must be re-embedded in the European social fabric102, and should 
no longer be considered as merely a technocratic instrument of governance. 
Law embodies the fundamental set of values and principles that govern any 
society, and the lack of a vision and direction that characterizes the European 
98 See BRuno, JaCquot, ManDin (2006) 519-536 (analysing the evolution of mechanisms of new govern-
ance in three fields, gender equality mainstreaming, open method of coordination (OMC) in pension reform, 
and benchmarking in the European research Area). See also eBeRlein, keRWeR (2002).
99 BRuno, JaCquot, ManDin (2006) employ the term “co-opetition” in relation to benchmarking, referring 
to the fact that “benchmarking prescribes the necessity of competitiveness by embedding the managerial 
rationality into co-operation among member states” (p. 523). A particularly important example is the so-
called Lisbon strategy, i.e., the programme of action related to the establishment of the EU as “the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world”, a process which according to them 
has caused a “paroxysm of a ‘government by numbers’” (p. 528). See euRopean CounCil, pResiDenCy Con-
Clusions, Lisbon European Summit, 23-24th March 2000, no. 100/1/00.
100 See BRuno, JaCquot, ManDin (2006), p. 533: “Benchmarks are conceptual tools which shape the Euro-
peanization process (…). Rather than acting by law and through coercive means, they operate on the basis 
of a management-by-objectives device (…). A process of Europeanization by figures seems to replace 
Community integration through law, which has until now implied that sovereign power should be assigned 
to supranational institutions” (p. 530). Therefore, they are a “comprehensive political technology”.
101 See the groundbreaking work of the Integration through law project, developed at the European Uni-
versity Institute of Florence under the direction of Mauro Cappelletti. Cappelletti, seCCoMBe, WeileR (1986).
102 Polanyi (1944). See also JoeRges, Falke (2011).
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Union today cannot be solved by using the plethora of instruments of new gov-
ernance as a shortcut: “EU law has emerged as instrumental to a degree that 
goes beyond the specific objectives pursued by particular norms. It has been 
instrumental in promoting the transformation of Europe from international, to 
supranational, or even constitutional, order. Thus, the premises underpinning EU 
law have a symbolic value, and their ‘tainting’ with the values of new governance 
might be seen to threaten not merely the integrity of ‘law’ as such, but the broad-
er dynamics of integration”103.
From the point of view of legal scholars working in the area of European 
private law, these developments open up an important and interesting field of 
research, one that has both high theoretical and practical relevance. From a 
practical point of view, the large body of rules that the EU is producing, also in 
relation to other transnational sources, needs to be studied in terms of its scope, 
aims and impact. From the theoretical point of view, there is an urgent need to 
develop research concerning the essential features of the new instruments of 
governance and their link with the private law of national legal systems. This 
implies the need to critically scrutinize existing legal concepts and categories, 
and develop a new analytical framework suited to this new context104, which 
takes into consideration the actors involved, and the methods and procedures 
applied. Compared to other contexts, particularly at the international level, it can 
be claimed that the use of measurement in the area of private law in the Europe-
an Union has been more limited. This may be due to several reasons: first of all, 
the EU has an institutional system that is very densely regulated, with a complex 
system of checks and balances among the institutions, and between the institu-
tions and the member States, that gives rise to a quasi-national framework that 
is very different from traditional international settings. Moreover, European legal 
culture is still largely based on qualitative methods, and therefore less open to 
apply measurement on a large scale. Yet, as we have seen, measurement and 
new modes of governance are making important inroads into the EU system, 
in line with the global trend, and they are having important consequences in 
shaping the evolving features of the European integration process in general, 
and of European law in particular. The study of instruments of quantification, 
such as indicators, rankings and benchmarking, fits into this wider setting, and 
requires lawyers to develop the ability and skills needed to establish a dialogue 
with other social scientists, and a comprehensive critical scrutiny of their tradi-
tional methods, concepts and categories, as well as those employed in the new 
103 sCott, tRuBek (2002), p. 9.
104 tuoRi (2014), p. 57 considers that “Probably ‘transnational law’, ‘legal pluralism’, ‘interlegality’, ‘legal 
perspectivism’ and, perhaps, ‘legal hybrid’ will belong to the lexis of the new legal Esperanto” (p. 55).
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forms of governance105. This new stance is also bound to have important prac-
tical policy implications. While measurement can be a very helpful instrument for 
analysis and decision-making, it should not become a fetish106. Quantification is 
complementary, not alternative, to law, just as governance is not a substitute for 
government, i.e., for the establishment of rules that regulate a society, which is 
an intrinsically political process: “Quantification has a great deal to contribute to 
global knowledge and governance, but it is important to resist its seductive claim 
to truth and to recognize it as only one form of knowledge with its own distinctive 
limitations. (…) We rely on numbers alone at our peril”107. 
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